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Introduction
A number of studies have been published in the 
past years on the power of the European Union 
(EU) to support post-communist transformation in 
the countries covered by the enlargement policy. 
Yet, relatively few attempts have been made to 
look at the countries where the EU seems to have 
certain ambitions, but which are beyond the EU’s 
enlargement policy. Ukraine is one of these countries. 
Beside the fact that Ukraine can be considered 
a test case for the EU’s ‘transformative power’ 
(Grabbe 2006) in the region, it is also a country 
whose stability and success of reforms would have 
a strong impact on the security of the EU. This is 
not only due to the fact that Ukraine is the largest 
country in Europe (territory-wise, apart from the 
European part of Russia) directly bordering the EU 
and has a population of over 45 million, but also due 
to the potential spillover effect that developments in 
Ukraine might have on the region. If Ukraine sets a 
precedent of successful democratisation supported 
by economic growth and improvement in quality of 
life, it might well encourage similar developments in 
the other countries in the region, including Russia. 
Therefore, the EU’s success in supporting the reform 
process in Ukraine will contribute immensely to the 
EU’s own long-term security and stability. From this 
perspective, it is important to understand the impact 
the EU has had on internal developments in Ukraine 
since the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
was launched.
At first glance, developments in Ukraine 
over the past years seem to suggest that the 
ENP has by and large failed. From the onset, the 
policy was aimed at promoting democracy, good 
governance and the rule of law, and these notions 
underpin all the ENP-related communications of the 
Commission and the Council’s decisions (European 
Commission 2004, 2006b, 2008). Yet, in the years 
following the Orange Revolution and the launch of 
the ENP (2004) Ukraine made almost no progress 
in the reform process1 and experienced constant 
political instability or even crisis. Although the 2010 
presidential elections put an end to the political 
infighting, they resulted into a de-facto one party 
rule with worrying trends towards limiting political 
freedoms. At the same time, the ability and, more 
importantly, willingness of the new government to 
implement reforms remains questionable.
1  However, it has to be recognised that Ukraine has 
managed to carry out free and fair elections over the past 
five years. Particularly, the 2010 presidential election was 
recognised to have met most OSCE and Council of Europe 
requirements. See: OSCE/ODIHR 2010. 
This paper, however, attempts to take a 
more complex approach, looking at different actors 
and processes in Ukraine and trying to trace the 
resonance, if not impact, the EU has had on them. 
This approach departs from the assumption that 
transformation and reforms cannot be imposed 
from outside, and claims that in order to succeed, 
the external pressure has to be matched by strong 
reform coalitions inside a partner country. The 
external actors, including the EU, can at best support 
domestic actors, structures and processes that 
already have a potential to foster reforms, but not 
replace them. The Europeanization literature, which 
combines rationalist and constructivist approaches 
(Börzel 2010), offers a useful framework for our 
analysis. It emphasises the role of both state actors 
and non-state actors in bringing about the change. 
From the rational choice perspective, the EU can 
have an impact through conditionality by offering 
rewards that outweigh the domestic adoption costs. 
If the costs are too high for the ruling political elites, 
the EU’s conditionality works through “differential 
empowerment of domestic actors” (Schimmelfennig/
Sedelmeier 2005: 11-12) by changing the domestic 
opportunity structure in favour of pro-European 
domestic actors outside of the power structures. In 
the latter case the EU creates a power asymmetry, 
since it makes the electorate reassess the costs of 
having a government, which hinders the integration 
of their country with the EU (Schimmelfennig et al. 
2005: 40). The constructivist approach emphasises 
the role of norm entrepreneurs, such as epistemic 
communities and advocacy networks, who socialise 
domestic actors into EU norms and therefore 
change their interests and identities (Börzel 2010: 
3). Brought together, these two approaches try to 
establish the EU’s interplay with different domestic 
actors, both within the power structures and outside 
them. 
While these approaches were explanatory 
where the Central and East European Countries 
(CEECs) were concerned, it is not the case in 
Ukraine and other ENP countries in the East. The 
EU’s policy, which can be characterised as a much 
weaker derivative of enlargement2, is matched by 
the domestic situation, which poses many more 
challenges than was the case with the CEECs. 
The EU’s conditionality and incentive structure is 
much weaker, which reduces the EU’s pressure for 
reforms in Ukraine. Moreover, the adoption costs for 
incumbent rent-seeking political elites are too high 
2  For the debate on whether the EU can replicate 
the success of enlargement regarding Central and Eastern 
Europe with the ENP countries without offering the prospect 
of membership, but by using the same tools see, for instance, 
Kelley 2006; Emerson et al. 2005; Smith 2005; Lynch 2003. 
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and civil society structures too weak, thus making 
domestic pressure for adaptation insignificant. 
Given these conditions, what potential does the 
EU have to ‘transform’ and ‘Europeanise’3 its 
Eastern neighbours, particularly Ukraine, given the 
experience of the ENP so far? Has this interplay of 
the EU’s policy on the one hand and various actors 
and processes in Ukraine on the other hand made 
any difference to the developments in the country? 
Has the EU been learning from its experience of 
dealing with the ENP partners in the course of the 
past years? These are some of the questions, which 
this paper attempts to answer. 
This paper argues that although the EU has 
had a limited impact on Ukraine since the ENP was 
introduced in 20054, this impact varied depending 
on the domestic actors and structures. It looks at 
three levels of actors: political elites, civil society, 
and civil servants or bureaucracy. In view of the 
weak conditionality, the paper assumes that the 
EU has had no impact on the political elites and, 
therefore, the overall reform process; yet, given the 
EU’s institutionalised and bureaucratised way of 
policy-making, as well as socialisation channels, it 
has triggered the process of incremental integration, 
with civil society and bureaucracy having become 
the key ‘agents’ of this integration. Nevertheless, 
this study assumes that this incremental integration 
has limited potential to trigger the genuine reform 
process. Moreover, it is constantly challenged by 
Russia’s influence, one that hampers Ukraine’s 
Europeanisation.
Each of the first three chapters of the paper 
dealing with the three levels of actors looks at the 
instruments the ENP has offered to tackle or engage 
with relevant actors. The chapters then proceed to 
show the response of these domestic actors to the 
EU’s policies within the specific Ukrainian context and 
conclude by outlining the learning process (evolution 
of policy) on the part of the EU and formulating 
recommendations for the further improvement of the 
EU policies. The final chapter of the paper looks at 
3 ‘Europeanization’ is understood here in a rather 
narrow sense as domestic adaptation of EU demands resulting 
from incentives, pressure, capacity building, financial 
assistance and other instruments. This definition is proposed 
by Gawrich et al. specifically for the analysis of the EU’s 
neigbourhood (Gawrich et al. 2009: 11). This understanding 
of Europeanization fells short of looking at whether EU 
norms and values become ‘internalised’ or ‘domesticated’ 
(Olsen 2002; Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2005 understand 
Europeanization in these terms when dealing with EU 
accession countries). This approach is justified given that the 
paper deals with rather recent developments.
4 The launch of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan in 
February 2005 is understood as the starting point for the ENP 
implementation in Ukraine.
Russia as an intervening variable in the EU’s efforts 
to support the reform process in Ukraine. 
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I  Conditionality and the incentive 
structure: do long-term incentives match 
short-term thinking?
Conditionality is often perceived as one of the 
most powerful instruments of the EU vis-à-vis its 
partner countries. It was particularly strong in the 
case of the Central and East European accession 
countries for which the incentive of membership 
was strong enough to downplay the costs related 
with domestic reforms. While the timing of the 
accession process and the issue areas where 
conditionality was strongest are debatable5, there 
is a general agreement that conditionality did work. 
The situation with the ENP countries seems to be 
rather different and several scholars have tried to 
conceptualise this. Schimmelfennig/Scholtz (2007: 
26), for instance, classify the ENP as ‘a low-credibility 
association policy’ and argue that because the policy 
excludes the membership perspective, it is doomed 
to fail. Delcour (2007: 146) argues that the case of 
Ukraine demonstrates that the ENP implementation 
in Ukraine took the shape of ‘accommodated 
conditionality’, whereby Ukraine has accommodated 
the ENP to its own preferences and built its own 
interpretation of the EU requirements. Sasse (2008) 
offers the concept of ‘conditionality-light’. Since 
conditionality in the ENP is so vague, it only provides 
external reference points for domestic political actors 
(both pro-EU and anti-EU), which they can utilize in 
domestic politics, as well as offer a loose framework 
for socialization. Overall, there is no agreement on 
how far the EU has been able to make a difference 
in the ENP countries and what further potential the 
EU’s policy possesses.  
Conditionality in the EU’s policy towards 
Ukraine so far
What kind of conditionality has the EU offered to the 
ENP countries and to Ukraine in particularly? The 
analysis of conditionality in the ENP and its impact 
is complicated by the fact that we are dealing with a 
policy in the making and, as such, a moving target. 
Yet, by taking a closer look at the policy instruments 
currently offered by the EU to Ukraine and those 
that are still being negotiated, we can identify two 
potentially strong and appealing incentives. These 
are the incentives of a deep and comprehensive free 
trade area (FTA) and visa free travel. 
None of the incentives was present in the ENP 
5  See, for instance, the overview article by Haughton 
2007.
from the beginning. For instance, the EU-Ukraine 
Action Plan, which was adopted by the Council of the 
EU in December 2004, did not mention them. Yet, 
both incentives appeared in the EU-Ukraine Action 
Plan signed by the parties in February 2005. The new 
version of the Action Plan, reinforced by additional 
measures following the Orange Revolution,6 
contained elements of conditionality. Thus, Ukraine 
was offered to start negotiations on the new 
‘enhanced’ agreement, namely the new contractual 
framework of the EU-Ukraine relationship that 
would replace the Partnership and the Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA), provided that Ukraine conducted 
free and fair parliamentary elections in March 2006. 
As the elections were recognised by the EU as free 
and fair, the parties started negotiations on the new 
agreement in February 2007. The new version of 
the Action Plan also contained the prospect of a free 
trade area between the EU and Ukraine. The start 
of the negotiations on this aspect was conditioned 
upon Ukraine’s accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). As Ukraine met all the WTO 
accession criteria7, the respective negotiations were 
opened in February 2008. Ultimately it was decided 
that the free trade provisions would be a substantial 
part of the new framework agreement and that it 
will be ‘deep and comprehensive’ (UEPLAC 2009). 
The offers of the new framework agreement and the 
FTA were reinforced as the EU-Ukraine Summit in 
September 2008 decided that the new agreement 
containing the deep and comprehensive FTA 
provisions would be called an Association Agreement 
(AA). The negotiations are underway and expected 
to be completed in 2010-2011.8
The prospect of visa free travel also appeared 
in the new version of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan, 
along with the less ‘attractive’9 offers of opening the 
Community Programmes and Agencies for Ukraine’s 
participation and the inclusion of the country into the 
Technical Assistance and Information Exchange 
instrument (TAIEX) and Twinning programmes of the 
EU. This offer was reinforced as the EU-Ukraine visa 
6 The so-called 10-point plan by Javier Solana and 
Benita Ferrero-Waldner, which was released in January 2005 as 
a reaction to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the ultimate 
election of the President based on the free and fair voting, was 
included into the new version of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan.
7  Ukraine formally joined the WTO in May 2008.
8  Due to the expectedly lengthy ratification process of 
the AA (including by all the EU member states), it is expected 
that the Interim Agreement covering the Community aspects of 
the AA will come into force much earlier.
9  Less ‘attractive’ in the sense that it is more difficult 
to ‘sell’ these offers to the political elites and the society.
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facilitation agreement10 came into force as of 2008. 
The agreement, a legally binding document, contains 
provisions that simplify the procedures for issuing 
visas for certain categories of citizens and sets the 
prospect of visa free travel in the long-term. The 
offer was further reinforced as the parties started the 
so-called visa dialogue and later on the EU decided 
to move the dialogue ‘into an operational phase’11. 
This means that the EU and Ukraine will now jointly 
draw up an Action Plan outlining the reforms Ukraine 
has to undertake in order to move towards visa free 
travel (Council of the European Union 2010). It is 
expected that the Action Plan will be signed during 
the EU-Ukraine Summit in November 2010. This 
recent development is rather revolutionary given 
that until recently the EU avoided any commitments 
beyond the formula of the vague and long-term 
prospect of visa free travel. Nevertheless it is not 
clear whether the level of commitment under the 
Action Plan will be the same as that under the visa 
free roadmaps offered by the EU to the Western 
Balkan countries. The latter directly resulted (given 
that a partner country meets the relevant reform 
objectives) in visa free travel.12 The reference to the 
Western Balkans is important given that Ukraine 
perceives the forthcoming action plan as the ENP 
version of the visa free roadmap.
 Theoretically, the incentives of a deep 
and comprehensive FTA and visa free travel can 
be regarded as attractive. Besides liberalizing 
the Ukrainian market, which will be of immediate 
benefit to the consumers and will also stimulate 
a higher-added-value production (as opposed to 
raw materials on which the Ukrainian economy is 
largely based), the FTA is expected to result in more 
widespread socio-economic benefits. These benefits 
include greater employment opportunities in some 
sectors of economy, better safety standards at work, 
modernized and developed infrastructure, as well 
as many other benefits (UEPLAC 2009). The same 
study also estimated that the trade flow between the 
EU and Ukraine would double and that the improved 
institutions and better governance resulting from the 
implementation of the AA would add 20-30% to Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) in the long term (UEPLAC 
2009: 13). The attractiveness of visa free travel 
needs less elaboration, since it is evident to anyone 
in Ukraine who has had the experience of going 
10  The full title is: Agreement on Facilitation of the 
Issuance of Visas between Ukraine and the EU. 
11  The EU Council of Ministers of Justice and Home 
Affairs, which took place in Luxembourg on 3 June 2010, took 
the decision.
12  Thus, visa free travel to the EU was launched in 
December 2009 for Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia, 
which successfully implemented their roadmaps.
through the complicated and time-consuming visa 
procedures. Yet, this incentive will not be credible 
until the visa free action plan between the EU and 
Ukraine explicitly leading to lifting visa requirements 
is concluded.
Apart from being attractive in the long-term 
perspective, both incentives are also conditional. 
They can be achieved only if Ukraine undertakes the 
necessary reforms. Therefore, the FTA will become 
reality in 10 to 15 years and can only be achieved 
if Ukraine complies with the provisions of the AA, 
which will include the liberalisation of the Ukrainian 
market and regulatory convergence with the EU via 
the incorporation of a specified list of the EU acquis 
into the national legislation.13 Moreover, the decisions 
reached by the joint institutions within the AA will be 
legally binding unlike under the current PCA where 
the decisions are for voluntary implementation. This 
will reinforce the EU conditionality in the agreement. 
With regards to visa free travel, Ukraine will have to 
carry out reforms to be specified in the forthcoming 
action plan. The reforms have to do with the security 
of documents and integrated border management 
among other issues and are well known from the 
experience of the Western Balkan countries’ visa 
free roadmaps.14 Whether those incentives are 
attractive in reality and whether they can stimulate 
certain reforms depends on the perception of them 
in Ukraine, particularly among the political elites and 
the society, as explored below.
Ukraine’s response: no compliance, yet some 
resonance and elements of the ‘discursive 
adoption’ 
From the perspective of Ukrainian political elites 
and the society at large, the problem with this type 
of conditionality is that the incentives are too distant 
and vague. Given the specific Ukrainian context, the 
nature of the political elites, and societal perceptions, 
the political elites do not see the specific benefits 
from these incentives for themselves and it is also 
difficult for them to instrumentalise them as a part 
of the domestic political struggle. This part of the 
chapter attempts to explain why this is so.  
Unlike the CEECs, where the society and 
the political elites shared a strong desire of ‘breaking 
13  The trade and trade related acquis communautaire, 
as well as separately negotiated parts of the acquis 
communautaire within sectoral cooperation.
14  A good overview of the relevant reforms is available 
at the web page of the European Stability Initiative http://www.
esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=371. 
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with the Communist past’ and ‘returning to Europe’, 
Ukraine lacks the same notions (Solonenko 2007: 36-
41). Therefore, after Ukraine gained independence it 
pursued a policy of partial reforms (Hellman 1998). 
The strong presidency in Ukraine, especially during 
the second term of president Kuchma (1999-2004) 
led to the establishment of a ‘patrimonial’ system15 
and the seizure of the state by ruling clans (Van 
Zon 2001) or business-administrative groups, 
also known as oligarchs. Trade in cheap natural 
resources (mostly metal), re-export of cheap 
energy resources from Russia and Turkmenistan, 
unfair privatisation deals, and state subsidization 
of some sectors, such as agriculture and the gas 
and coal industry where all means of accumulating 
wealth for the newly established entrepreneurs 
(often former Soviet nomenclature leaders). In 
exchange for supporting the consolidation of the 
semi-authoritarian regime under Kuchma, they 
enjoyed access to the sources of political power 
and managed to acquire monopolistic authority over 
the economic wealth of the country (Puglisi 2007). 
After the Orange Revolution and to a large extent 
due to the revised Constitution of December 200416, 
the powers of the president were weakened and 
multiple centres of authority emerged. The business-
administrative groups adjusted themselves to the 
new and more competitive conditions and managed 
to build strong links with all successful parties in the 
wake of the 2006 parliamentary elections. Under 
these circumstances, in order to understand what 
drives the rhetoric and behaviour of the political 
elites in Ukraine it is helpful to look at the interests 
of business-administrative groups behind them. 
Access to political power, and unequal rules of the 
game protected by a fair judiciary, is still perceived 
as the best guarantee for securing and protecting 
one’s economic interests. Given the overwhelming 
majority of legal initiative is exercised by members of 
the parliament, and not the government, one can be 
sure that the decision-making in the country is highly 
influenced by narrow particularistic interests and a 
non-transparent lobbying.
Within such a system, political elites 
pursue two types of interests: gaining short-term 
economic benefits for themselves and for multiple 
15  Wallander (2007) uses this term with respect to 
Russia. However, it can easily be applied to Ukraine under 
Kuchma, with the difference that the Ukrainian version of the 
system was weaker and patchy, i.e not covering the whole of 
the society, political life and economy. Many elements of this 
system are still present today with industrial-economic interests 
heavily involved in political life.
16  The Constitution was revised as art of the intra-elite 
compromise. It paved the way for the re-run of the second 
round of the presidential elections, which had initially brought 
people to the streets.
party sponsors and being (re-) elected as the 
best guarantee for protecting their own economic 
interests. While principally in favour of European 
integration, political elites and business interests 
behind them have little understanding of what 
integration with the EU (more specifically the FTA) 
will bring to them (Puglisi 2007; Popescu/Wilson 
2009). While they attempt to influence the negotiation 
process of the AA17 where, for instance, import tariffs 
are concerned, this influence is limited to the short-
term losses they might incur, rather than trying to 
shape the long-term economic relationship between 
Ukraine and the EU.  
Contrary to the vague and long-term benefits 
the EU offers, there are more immediate benefits 
that are offered by non-transparent business 
opportunities, with the energy sector being the 
most vivid example. At the same time, complying 
with EU requirements will bring substantial short-
term costs, as a result of the increased competition 
and transparency. Complying with EU requirements 
means opening up the market for competition with 
EU products and services and losing rent from 
protectionist regulations. It also entails introducing 
transparency and losing profit from non-transparent 
economic schemes protected by political actors. 
From this perspective it is easy to understand 
why Ukraine has difficulties in complying with the 
requirements of the energy declaration it signed with 
the EU in Brussels in March 2009.18 The declaration 
is aimed at reforming and modernising Ukraine’s 
gas transit system, in particular via separating gas 
transit to the EU from its distribution inside Ukraine 
and introducing transparency to the energy system 
and market. So far Ukraine has failed to follow up 
on these requirements, which speaks for the strong 
resistance inside the country to the reforms bringing 
Ukraine closer to the EU. It appears more beneficial 
to the political elites to preserve the status quo rather 
than to introduce the reforms for the sake of the long-
term benefits for the country and its society. 
The situation is further complicated by the 
fact that the society in Ukraine remains ambivalent 
about the direction Ukraine should move in19 and, 
17  Two interviews in Kyiv with a representative of 
the EU and a representative of the Ukrainian government in 
September 2009 confirmed this. 
18  On 23 March 2009, the EU hosted an investment 
conference in Brussels where it was agreed to grant Ukraine 
a 2.5 billion Euros loan for the rehabilitation of its gas transit 
system. Moreover, a Joint EU-Ukraine Declaration was signed, 
wherein Ukraine committed itself to undertake reforms in the 
energy sector.
19  Not meaning in geographical terms, but rather in 
terms of the civilizational choice between the European system 
of values (which is translated into the model of governance) 
and any other alternative. 
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therefore, the European integration issues can hardly 
be instrumentalised by the political elites to win scores 
in the domestic political struggle. Anything European 
is undeniably perceived as being of good quality, 
but too far and distant to be necessarily relevant for 
Ukraine in practical terms. One can see numerous 
advertisements in Ukraine offering ‘European 
quality’ (meaning high quality) services and goods, 
yet, people hardly perceive themselves to be 
European.20 Moreover the situation has deteriorated 
over the past five years due to the disillusionment 
about the prospect of Europeanization both related 
to the failure of the political elites to carry out reforms, 
and the enlargement ‘fatigue’ in the EU. When asked 
whether integration with the EU could become a 
national idea that would unite all the regions of 
Ukraine, 47% of respondents in Western Ukraine 
answered ‘Yes’, with only 23,5 % of respondents 
from Southern Ukraine having agreed. At the same 
time 57,3% of respondents from Southern Ukraine 
answered ‘No’, with 40,7% of respondents from 
Central Ukraine and 42,5% from Eastern Ukraine 
being of the same opinion (Razumkov Centre 2008: 
38, 46). When offered several foreign policy options 
and asked to choose one priority option, only 27,5% 
on the national scale chose ‘relationship with EU 
member states’, while 51,1% prefer ‘relationship with 
Russia’ (Razumkov Centre 2008: 41-43). This was 
the case in 2008, whereas almost 40% preferred the 
EU in the spring of 2005 when the memories of the 
Orange Revolution were fresh and the EU was high 
on the agenda. Given this public opinion it makes no 
sense for political elites to campaign on EU-related 
issues. This was well demonstrated by the 2010 
presidential campaign when the EU-related issues 
(unlike Russia-related) were hardly on the agenda. 
Nevertheless, the EU has not been 
completely absent from the Ukrainian political scene. 
The Ukrainian political elites seek legitimacy and 
belonging to the club of European political leaders. 
During 2005-2009, both the Prime Minister Yulia 
Tymoshenko and the President Viktor Yushchenko 
as leaders of their respective political parties 
participated in the summits of the European People’s 
Party where their parties have an observer status. 
Both leaders, as well as the oppositional leader of 
the time, Viktor Yanukovych, appealed to the EU for 
mediation when the political crises broke out in the 
spring of 2007. Both Tymoshenko and Yushchenko 
were in Brussels in March 2009 to sign a declaration 
with the EU on the modernisation of the Ukrainian 
gas transit network. Finally, Viktor Yanukovych, as 
the newly elected President in 2010, made his first 
foreign trip to Brussels. Moreover, there seems to 
20  Only 30 per cent of Ukrainians perceive themselves 
to be European (Razumkov Centre 2008: 40).
be a lower-denominator consensus among the 
Ukrainian political elites that European integration is 
good. This is because so far it has been possible 
to preserve good relationship with the EU and even 
pursue integration without incurring the costs of 
reforms. Indeed, although the reforms have not been 
implemented, non-compliance has not endangered 
relationship with the EU. Thus, as Wolczuk (2009: 
199) put it, Ukrainian political elites have disagreed on 
‘everything but Europe’. This EU-related consensus 
creates a good basis for promoting relevant issues 
in public discourse. 
The elites have also attempted to 
instrumentalise EU-related issues in their desire to 
win popular support, although, as pointed above, 
the society is ambivalent about the issue. For 
instance, several months before the EU-Ukraine 
annual summit that took place in Paris under the 
French Presidency in September 2008, President 
Yushchenko repeatedly stressed that Ukraine would 
be offered an ‘associated membership’ in the EU. The 
summit decided that the new enhanced agreement 
the EU and Ukraine were negotiating would be called 
Association Agreement. Yet, the President was 
seeking to appear to the voters as the leader of the 
country, which the EU was ready to accept into the 
club. From this perspective the notion of ‘associated 
membership’, although non-existent in reality, was 
rather convenient for popular discourse. Another 
example had to do with the presidential elections, 
which took place in February 2010.21 For the past 
few months before the annual meeting of the EU-
Ukraine Cooperation Council in December 2009 
both the President and the Prime Minister lamented 
that Ukraine would sign the Association Agreement 
with the EU by the end of 2009, despite the fact that 
the provisions of the agreement, especially the free 
trade provisions, still required many more rounds 
of negotiations. The most recent example includes 
that of President Yanukovych promising visa free 
travel with the EU before the end of 201022, despite 
the fact that by that time Ukraine was not even 
offered the visa free action plan mentioned above. 
In contrast with these examples, the representatives 
of the Office of the President Yushchenko along with 
other officials suggested several times that Ukraine 
should introduce visa requirements for EU citizens in 
order to restore the symmetry, which was distorted 
when Ukraine unilaterally lifted visa requirements 
21  The first round took place on 17 January, while the 
second round took place on 7 February 2010.
22  Several news agencies reported President 
Yanukovych saying this on the occasion of the border guards 
day on 26 May 2010. See, for instance, http://www.pravda.
com.ua/news/2010/05/26/5077485/ and http://ua.for-ua.com/
comments/2010/05/31/122401.html.
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for EU citizens in 2005. This has to do with the fact 
that the topic of Ukrainians queuing for Schengen 
visas and encountering numerous obstacles in 
the consulates of the EU member states is very 
popular in the Ukrainian media. Despite the fact 
that Ukraine’s negotiating position in its aspiration to 
move towards a visa-free regime with the EU would 
be seriously undermined by such a step, making 
moves that would be appealing to the voters often 
seems to be a more immediate priority. Whether this 
rhetoric contributes to gaining more voters’ support 
is questionable, nevertheless the political elites do 
find it useful to resort to such rhetoric.
The examples above confirm that although 
the EU hardly makes a difference where the reform 
process in the country is concerned, it has become 
a reference point for the political elites. On the one 
hand, the EU is perceived as a prestigious club of 
political leaders where the Ukrainian political elites 
want to be involved; on the other hand, a certain 
EU-related agenda is instrumentalised as a part of 
the domestic political struggle. Moreover, reference 
to the traditional European values such as freedom 
of expression, rule of law, respect for human rights 
and division of powers between the state institutions 
have become rather frequent in the rhetoric of the 
political elites. This does not mean that European 
norms are implemented in practice in Ukraine, but 
they are undeniably perceived as legitimate and 
suitable for the country. From this perspective it is 
also possible to argue that a certain amount of social 
learning or ‘discursive adoption’ (Schimmelfennig/
Sedelmeier 2005: 20) of European norms has 
taken place in Ukraine. From both rational choice 
and social learning perspectives, formal and 
behavioural adoption might be expected to follow 
(Schimmelfennig 2000: 118-119; Schimmelfennig/
Sedelmeier 2005: 20).23
 
The learning process on the part of the EU 
and what can still be improved
Departing from these dynamics one can think of 
several ways for the EU to strengthen its leverage 
in Ukraine. Introducing conditionality with short-term 
incentives and clear thresholds might be a way out. 
The experience of accession countries indicated 
that thresholds matter. Thus, for instance, Haughton 
23  From a rational perspective, political actors that 
have rhetorically committed themselves to certain norms risk 
loosing their credibility and, as the result, their legitimacy if 
they act against those norms (Schimmelfennig 2000: 118-119). 
From a social learning perspective, the internalisation of norms 
logically follows discursive adoption (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2005:20).
(2007: 235) showed that the EU’s transformative 
power was the strongest “during the decision phase 
of whether or not to open accession negotiations”. 
This argument can be extended by arguing that 
the EU’s transformative power was the strongest 
during the decision phase of whether to move to 
the subsequent stage of the accession process. 
Whereas in the case of the 2004 entrants there was 
only one clearly defined threshold, which separated 
different stages of the accession process (pre-
negotiation phase and negotiation phase), in the 
case of Bulgaria and Romania another threshold 
appeared – that of the possibility of applying the 
postponement clause. Evidence suggests that during 
the period of deciding whether to invite Romania and 
Bulgaria to join the EU in 2007 (that is not evoking 
the postponement clause), some reforms were 
accelerated (Noutcheva/Bechev 2008). The EU 
thus succeeded in promoting reforms by defining 
thresholds, which separate different stages of the 
accession process, and by linking the admission to 
each subsequent stage to the necessity of meeting 
specific conditions. Interestingly enough, in the case 
of the Western Balkans and Turkey the European 
Commission introduced benchmarks for the closing 
and opening of chapters in the process of accession 
negotiations, which was not the case for the CEECs 
(European Commission 2006a: 6). 
With this experience and the short-term 
thinking of the Ukrainian political elites in mind, 
the introduction of short-term incentives that could 
be communicated to the public and linked to very 
specific reform requirements might stimulate political 
elites to comply. These requirements preferably have 
to be included in the bilaterally agreed documents, 
which are legally or politically binding. More 
importantly, these specific reform requirements, 
to which the Ukrainian government would have 
committed itself, would serve as reference points 
for the civil society advocacy activities in Ukraine. 
In other words, it is not about introducing new long-
term incentives, but rather about structuring the way 
towards the longer-term incentives. For instance, 
as it was mentioned, the deep and comprehensive 
FTA is a long-term objective that could be achieved 
within the time frame of 10 to 15 years. However, 
one could probably think of intermediate short-term 
and medium-term objectives, which, in exchange 
for meeting specific EU criteria, would bring about 
tangible benefits either for certain economic circles, 
who have a strong lobby in the parliament, or for 
consumers, whose voting preferences might be 
influenced by the EU-related agenda. 
To conclude, one has to state that the EU 
has learned from experience and has improved its 
approach in terms of moving towards a more specific 
formulation of immediate objectives. A positive step 
in this direction was the so-called ‘Füle matrix’ 
– a matrix of reforms handed in to the Ukrainian 
government by the Commissioner Stefan Füle 
during his visit to Ukraine in April 2010. The 6-page 
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matrix lists the priority reform steps in seven areas24 
expected from Ukraine. Importantly, it differentiates 
among the short-term (6 months), medium term (6-
18 months) and long-term (more than 18 months) 
objectives and indicates both the EU’s support and 
the EU’s responses to the implementation of any 
given step.25 This was the first time that the EU 
offered to Ukraine a document with clear reform 
priorities and benchmarks with clear rewards to 
follow once reforms are implemented. Although it 
has no official status and was not agreed bilaterally, it 
already sends a clear signal to the Ukrainian political 
elites and the society as to the EU’s expectations. 
The budgetary support in the framework 
of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument (ENPI), which is a new external assistance 
exercise for Ukraine, is another good example. 
Ukraine is eligible for 82 million Euros to support the 
implementation of its energy strategy. While the initial 
first tranche of 23 million Euros was given to Ukraine 
without any reform-related conditions26, the second 
tranche is already conditioned upon the fulfilment 
of certain objectives. They include, for instance, 
the development and implementation of specific 
legislation, but also objectives such as not increasing 
the quasi-fiscal deficit in the energy sector or starting 
the construction of a pilot international gas metering 
station at one of the entry points into the gas transit 
system of Ukraine (Tessier-Stall et al. 2009: 74-75). 
It remains to be seen whether Ukraine will be able 
to deliver on these issues in its anticipation of the 
receipt of the second tranche.
Another positive development is that the EU 
has started to actively communicate the benefits of 
the rapprochement to the ordinary Ukrainians. The 
press statement, distributed by the EU Delegation 
to Ukraine the day after the inauguration of the new 
President elected in 2010, elaborated on specific 
benefits Ukraine will attain from concluding the 
deep and comprehensive free trade area with the 
EU.27 Although still vague, this press statement has 
24  Those include political reforms, macro-financial 
stability, trade and business environment, mobility, energy 
sector, environment, and civil aviation. 
25  This matrix was never made public but handed in via 
diplomatic channels. Yet, the matrix leaked to the Ukrainian 
expert community and media (Sydorenko 2010: 1); many 
believe it was a deliberate step on the part of the EU in order 
to increase the pressure on the government from within the 
country.
26  The only conditions were to establish a Joint 
Monitoring Group to oversee the fulfillment of the 
implementation and the adoption of the Law on State Budget 
2009 as well as the necessary financial regulations for the 
receipt of the budgetary support (Tessier-Stall et. al 2009: 45). 
27  See http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/press_
corner/all_news/news/2010/20100226_01_en.htm . 
marked the first attempt to communicate the benefits 
of integration with the EU in a simple and clear 
manner to the different audiences in the country 
whilst concentrating on the impact integration would 
have on these audiences. More messages of the 
kind need to be communicated to the Ukrainian 
society, since making it more aware of the benefits of 
Europeanisation and, as the result, more demanding 
where relevant domestic policies are concerned, will 
increase the costs of no reforms for the Ukrainian 
political elites. 
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II Stimulating the pressure from within: 
empowering reform-minded constituencies 
and structures in Ukraine
According to our framework for the analysis, a 
strong demand and pressure for reforms from within 
is an important prerequisite for the EU to make a 
difference in a given country. If the power holders 
are veto-players, the EU’s conditionality changes 
the domestic opportunity structure in favour of pro-
European domestic actors outside of the power 
structures (Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2005: 
11-12). This was the case with the EU accession 
countries, where, according to Vachudova (2005: 
139-179) the EU helped to change the institutional 
environment in three ways: it stimulated the 
consolidation of reform-minded actors, it offered 
information (along with other external actors) that 
helped the oppositional actors make their agenda 
compatible with EU requirements, and finally, the 
EU offered immediate rewards for political actors 
that secured the implementation of the relevant 
agenda after they were elected. This was the case 
in Slovakia in 1998 when Vladimir Mečiar lost to 
Mikuláš Dzurinda, an event that changed the pace of 
the country’s integration with the EU. The Romanian 
elections in 1996 and the Bulgarian elections in 1997 
are also sometimes given as examples of the impact 
of the EU’s leverage.28 Thus, the domestic reform-
minded actors both from oppositional political parties 
and the civil society served as interlocutors between 
the EU and the broader society (electorate), and the 
society started to associate the rapid transformation 
of their country towards the EU with these actors 
(Vachudova 2005: 162). 
The situation of the EU-Ukraine relationship 
is somewhat different for two reasons. Firstly, 
the incentive structure is rather weak, as shown 
in the previous chapter, which makes it difficult to 
mobilize society against the current power holders. 
This might partially have to do with the fact that 
there is no prospect of membership, while the 
incentives available to Ukraine, such as the deep 
and comprehensive FTA and the visa-free regime 
are not appealing enough to mobilise the electorate 
and society at large. Moreover, the absence of 
competition with other countries of the region on their 
way towards the EU reduces the pressure for reforms. 
In the case of the CEECs, competition among the 
countries played an important role. Notably, the case 
of Slovakia is often highlighted as an example of the 
only country among the other eight aspirants for EU 
28  Vachudova (2005) , for instance, argues that the 
EU’s ‘active leverage’ led indirectly to the defeat of illiberal 
elites in Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia in 1996, 1997 and 
1998 respectively.
membership from Central and Eastern Europe that 
was refused the opening of accession negotiations 
in 1997 on political, not economic grounds.29 Being 
a laggard in a group of relatively similar countries 
definitely stimulated the change of elites in Slovakia. 
This regional environment is missing in the case 
of Ukraine, whereby the countries of the region 
– covered by the Eastern Partnership (EaP) – are 
too different in terms of both their aspirations with 
respect to the EU and their domestic developments. 
Moreover, Ukraine is already the frontrunner in terms 
of its relationship with the EU and sets an example 
for other countries of the region.
Secondly, there are no strong oppositional 
actors in Ukraine whose power base lies outside the 
oligarchy structures and could therefore challenge 
the current system based on rent-seeking. As the 
2010 presidential election in Ukraine has shown, 
political contestation, although challenging the 
system rhetorically, predominantly took place 
among the candidates who are part of the system. 
The ideological underpinnings are largely missing in 
Ukrainian politics and political competition is limited; 
Wilson (2006) calls this the “virtual politics”. Given 
this nature of Ukrainian politics, it is clear that the 
EU has no partners among the political-spectrum 
actors on whom it could rely in terms of bringing 
about a change in the regime. In this situation, 
reform-minded actors can only be found within civil 
society, especially within the non-governmental 
organizations sector. When the EU promotes the 
same requirements, which civil society supports 
and advocates for30, the chance of reforms taking 
place increases. In this respect, the commitments 
the Ukrainian government has made in the course 
of its relationship with the EU serve as an important 
reference point for the EU and civil society actors in 
Ukraine to combine efforts in demanding compliance 
and advocating for reforms. 
29  The other countries of the so-called ‘second wave’ 
– Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania – were refused on 
economic grounds.
30  Jacoby (2006), for instance, argues in his review 
of several studies with extensive empirical data that external 
influences tend to be successful if they operate in tandem 
with domestic actors and interests. Other scholars support the 
opinion that the external actors have better chances of having 
an impact on the domestic reform process if they operate ‘in 
coalition’ with domestic actors and structures that share the 
same interests and goals (Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2005; 
Carothers 2004).  
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EU support for strengthening the role of civil 
society in Ukraine so far 
To what extent have certain EU policies 
contributed to strengthening the voice and actual 
impact of the civil society in Ukraine? An important 
starting point is that the EU’s involvement with actors 
outside of the power structures in Ukraine has so far 
been limited. In effect, the EU has never pursued 
the objective of creating pressure for reforms from 
within. Neither has the EU adapted to the assumption 
that the governments in partner countries in this part 
of the world (former Soviet Union) are veto players 
and as such hardly contribute to achieving reform 
objectives, which the EU attempts to promote. Most 
of the EU’s efforts, diplomatic, human and financial, 
are directed at governments, while the EU’s potential 
allies, civil society organizations, although interested 
in reforms, remain rather weak. A study carried out 
by the Open Society Institute Brussels showed that 
during 2007-2009 only 0,37 percent of EU funding 
directed at Ukraine supported the efforts of civil 
society organizations.31
Nevertheless, the EU has increasingly 
attempted to involve civil society organizations in 
the reform process, particularly since the ENP was 
launched. Firstly, the EU has opened up various 
socialization channels with the civil society in the EU. 
This is less true where the European Commission’s 
activities are concerned, but more so in the combined 
efforts of both the European Commission and the 
Member States. The European Commission itself 
has offered limited opportunities for cooperation 
between Ukrainian and the EU-based civil society. 
There are many examples of this. The Institution 
Building Partnership Programme implemented within 
the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (TACIS) programme supported 
57 international partnership projects with Ukrainian 
representatives participation during 2002-200832. 
Ukrainian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
can partially implement projects with their EU-based 
counterparts through the European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Cross-
border cooperation programmes cover cooperation 
in western regions of Ukraine. The Youth in Action 
Programme offers opportunities for civil society 
activists from the EU and Ukraine to cooperate. 
In addition to that, the EU member states provide 
numerous opportunities, which often involve grants 
31  The average figure for the six Eastern Partnership 
countries is 2,5 percent. The Study is forthcoming and will be 
available at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/brussels. 
32  See IBPP web-site for further information: http://
www.ibpp.org.ua. 
to NGOs from their countries in order to implement 
joint projects with NGOs from Ukraine and other 
countries. The four Visegrad countries, the Baltic 
states, Germany (via political foundations), and the 
United Kingdom are among the most active donors 
in this respect (Solonenko/Jarabik 2008: 92-95), 
with Sweden, Netherlands and Denmark offering 
important support as well (Shapovalova 2010: 4).
Secondly, the EU has provided limited 
support in the form of grants to Ukrainian NGOs. 
Again, only the EIDHR, which has country-based 
schemes to support NGO projects at the national 
level, and Cross-border cooperation programmes, 
offer such opportunities on top of the limited budget 
available at the Delegation of the European Union to 
Ukraine directly. The above-mentioned EU member 
states also offer limited grant assistance (Solonenko/
Jarabik 2008: 92-95). Additionally, some civil society 
initiatives are funded through the Joint Framework 
Programmes of the European Commission and 
the Council of Europe, where the latter implements 
projects with the European Commission’s funding. 
The total amount of funding to NGOs is, however, 
rather limited, as indicated above.
Thirdly, the EU has increasingly involved 
Ukrainian NGOs in the consultation process over 
various issues. Thus, the Delegation of the European 
Union to Ukraine created an online register on its 
web page, where Ukrainian NGOs can register 
in order to be invited for consultations on an ad 
hoc basis whenever the opportunity arises.33 The 
Delegation already consulted the NGOs on the 
draft of the ENPI National Indicative Programme 
2011-2013 for Ukraine, which was a part of the 
Ukrainian Country Strategy Paper mid-term review 
in the spring of 2009. The NGOs were invited by 
the Delegation to discuss the progress Ukraine 
had made in 2007 and 2008 in order to contribute 
to shaping the European Commission’s Progress 
Reports on Ukraine published in April 2008 and April 
2009. In fact, inviting NGOs from the ENP countries 
to contribute to the European Commission’s annual 
progress reports has almost become a tradition, 
which is a welcome development.
The launch of the EaP in May 2009 has 
enhanced opportunities for civil society organizations 
to become involved in shaping the EU’s relationship 
with its neighbouring countries. Thus, the EaP Civil 
Society Forum, whose first meeting took place 
in November 2009 with the participation of NGO 
and think-tank representatives from all the partner 
countries and the EU, served as an important 
opportunity for civil society leaders from the EaP 
region to exchange information about the reform 
33  See http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/eu_
ukraine/civil_society_dialogue/index_en.htm. 
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needs of their countries and the EU’s role in the 
process, and to develop recommendations for the 
first EaP ministerial meeting that took place in 
December 2009.34 More importantly, the very launch 
of the EaP Civil Society Forum as an institution 
marks the recognition of the role of civil society as an 
actor in shaping the EaP countries relations with the 
EU and offers a formal channel for presenting policy 
ideas and proposals. Both the Ukrainian authorities 
and the European Commission made it explicit that 
civil society participation in the development of the 
EaP and specific projects within the initiative are 
highly welcome. 
The efforts outlined above seem to be 
significant, when compared to the period before the 
EU’s eastward enlargement and the launch of the 
ENP. Yet, these efforts are meager in the context 
of the EU’s overall cooperation with Ukraine where 
power structures dominate and given the weakness 
of the civil society in Ukraine. 
 
The response of the Ukrainian civil society
In view of the activities above, the EU’s impact on 
strengthening civil society as an actor in the reform 
process has been mixed. On the one hand, the very 
form of the EU-Ukraine relationship, which lacks a 
strong incentive structure, has not been conducive 
to mobilising reform-minded parts of the society 
against rent-seeking and non-accountable elites. 
Neither has the EU been able to tackle the structural 
weaknesses of civil society in Ukraine, which include 
limited impact (both in terms of influencing policy 
and influencing public opinion) and dependence on 
foreign funding among other deficiencies. On the 
other hand, the EU has created a new dimension 
and new reference points for civil society activities, 
and offered new tools that civil society organizations 
might use to push for a domestic reform agenda. In 
many ways, the Ukrainian civil society still has to get 
exposed to this new dimension, as well as still having 
to learn how to use the tools. Yet, the instruments are 
there, they can be improved, and it is in many ways 
the Ukrainian civil society’s homework to capture the 
opportunities.
First of all, through its activities, the EU 
has targeted only a limited circle of civil society 
organisations. The EU has reached the most active 
and vibrant niches of civil society, who are also 
the most professional, yet this segment is rather 
small. However, the EU has so far failed or has not 
34  For more information on the EaP Civil Society 
Forum and its materials see http://ec.europa.eu/external_
relations/eastern/civil_society/index_en.htm. 
tried to address the problem of involving broader 
segments of civil society in the EU-related agenda, 
such as, for instance, trade unions and civil society 
platforms working on environment, the disabled, 
and other themes. Thus, the vast majority of vibrant 
and diverse civil society organizations in Ukraine35 
have so far remained ignorant about Ukraine’s EU-
related agenda and as such have not been able 
to instrumentalise the EU requirements and policy 
instruments in their advocacy and public opinion 
activities in the country. The same concerns political 
parties and their youth organizations. Although 
political parties might not be regarded as part of 
the civil society36, exposing them to the EU is very 
important as exemplified by the experience of the EU 
accession countries. Pridham (2005), for instance, 
shows that transnational party linkages had an 
important democratising influence on the CEECs’ 
political parties. 
Secondly, the EU has not contributed to 
solving the structural problems of civil society in 
Ukraine. One aspect has to do with underdeveloped 
regulatory environment, which even goes contrary 
to the Recommendations of the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe and the decision 
of the European Court of Human Rights.37 Related 
to this is the lack of funding from the state budget 
to support civil society organisations or outsource 
some social services to them. Both have to do with 
a lack of recognition of civil society as a partner 
in public policy. Another aspect has to do with the 
35  As of 2007, nearly 40,000 community organizations 
were registered in Ukraine, 19,000 professional unions 
and associations, 8,000 charitable foundations, 6,000 
neighbourhood associations, and 5,500 consumer groups. 
However, experts have estimated that of this large number, only 
around 2,500 civil society organizations are socially active and 
independent (Bystrytsky 2008, cited in Solonenko et al. 2008: 
17). A study commissioned by the European Commission in 
2009 identified a number of NGO networks in Ukraine dealing 
with human rights, democratization, disabilities, environment, 
public policy and civic activism, regional development, HIV/
AIDS, access to judiciary, consumer protection, media, and 
youth (The European Union’s TACIS Programme for Ukraine 
2009). These organizations and networks provide services, 
carry out advocacy activities, provide expertise, and work with 
public opinion.
36  For instance, Diamond (1999: 218-260) argues that 
civil society is different from political society, as civil society 
represents ‘the whole of a person‘s or a community‘s interests’, 
but not struggles for power (as political parties that belong to 
political society do). 
37  See Recommendation of the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe on the legal status of non-
governmental organizations in Europe ((№ СМ/Rec(2007)14), 
http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/Civil_
society/ and the Decision of the European Court of Human 
Rights (Koretsky and others versus Ukraine 2008). 
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lack of impact on the reform process and public 
opinion on the part of civil society. Highly qualified 
think tanks have developed numerous proposals on 
how to reform the Constitution, the judicial system, 
the public administration and electoral system, just 
to mention a few vital reform areas. Moreover, the 
institutions of the Council of Europe like the Venice 
Commission and the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe promoted the same agenda. 
Despite this, there has been no political will to take 
recommendations on board and promote relevant 
reforms. Similarly, mass media, mostly controlled 
by particular business industrial groups, has rarely 
reported on civil society activities and messages, 
thus preserving the gap between civil society and 
the society at large. 
Yet, the EU has managed to empower 
certain segments of the Ukrainian civil society, mostly 
concentrated within the professional circle of NGOs 
and think tanks. Thus, over the past few years several 
civil society initiatives dealing with specific issues of 
the EU-Ukraine relationship were developed. One 
example is the ‘Europe Without Barriers’ Initiative38, 
which regularly carries out independent monitoring 
of visa issuance practices by the EU member states’ 
consulates in Ukraine and has arguably managed 
to influence the implementation of the EU-Ukraine 
visa facilitation agreement. Other examples include 
the civil society’s independent function of monitoring 
the implementation of the Association Agenda39 and 
before that of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan40; the 
network of European Information Centres, based 
in the regional libraries and covering 22 regions 
of Ukraine41, which carries out awareness-raising 
activities; European Space Portal, the consolidated 
civil society resource on European integration42, as 
well as European Educational Portal43 are worth 
mentioning among many other initiatives created and 
sustained exclusively by civil society organizations. 
It is difficult to say whether the EU has 
empowered the above-mentioned civil society 
groups directly. Most probably not, if judging from 
38  See http://www.novisa.org.ua. 
39  See http://es-ukraina.blogspot.com/ for materials 
of the consortium of Ukrainian think-tanks including the 
Ukrainian Centre for Independent Political Research, the 
Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting and the 
Centre for Political and Legal Reforms with support from the 
international NGO “Internews Ukraine” and the International 
Renaissance Foundation. 
40  See Razumkov Centre 2007 for the details of the 
relevant project.
41  See http://eu.prostir.ua/initiatives/eurocentres.html. 
42  See http://eu.prostir.ua. 
43  See http://www.eu-edu.org. 
the perspective that these groups have not been 
targeted by the EU grant schemes or any other 
direct forms of influence. Yet, the EU has contributed 
by simply being there and offering standards and 
values, which those civil society groups support 
and would like to have implemented in Ukraine. The 
EU has also contributed by having developed an 
intensive agenda for the EU-Ukraine relationship, 
where different civil society groups can find issues, 
which they can promote and work with. Finally, by 
having induced the Ukrainian government into taking 
specific reform commitments via the conditionality in 
the direct budgetary support, the Association Agenda, 
and the visa free action plan, the EU has offered 
an opportunity for civil society groups in Ukraine to 
use the EU as a reference point and simply work 
in partnership in order to demand compliance on 
the part of the government. For instance, the most 
recent monitoring report published by a consortium 
of think-tanks in Ukraine revealed that by July 2010 
only 3 out of the existing 58 priorities of the AA for 
2010 were implemented entirely, while 49 priorities 
were under the implementation process and 8 
priorities not implemented at all.44 This information 
might not have any direct impact on decision-
making; yet having such impartial and critical opinion 
of the activities might create additional pressure on 
the government. Moreover, the openness of certain 
public authorities (below the level of the political 
elites who are linked to economic interests) to the 
EU-related agenda and cooperation with civil society 
has created a favourable environment for the EU’s 
influence. More specifically, this has created entry 
points for NGOs and think tanks to be involved in 
shaping some decisions. Thus, the Civil Society 
Expert Council with the Ukrainian side of the EU-
Ukraine Cooperation Committee (chaired by the 
Vice Prime Minister for European integration) 
was set up in the summer of 2008, comprising 31 
experts. Council representatives have been invited 
by the Committee, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Ministry of Justice and other central authorities to 
discuss various issues dealing with the EU-Ukraine 
relationship; civil society experts were also invited to 
contribute to drafting several governmental decisions 
in the field of European integration.
Thus, while the EU has not contributed to the 
civil society development and tackling the structural 
problems concerning civil society’s lack of links with 
both the political elites and the broader public, it has 
contributed indirectly. As argued by Rommens (2008: 
11), by making authorities committed to certain 
reform agenda and certain requirements, the EU 
has produced “second order effects”, since it offered 
44  For more details see http://es-ukraina.blogspot.
com/2010/07/implementation-of-ukraines-eu-related_09.html. 
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additional reference points to non-governmental 
organisations, with the help of which NGOs can 
attempt to hold the governments accountable and 
demand compliance. The EU-related requirements 
open up enormous potential for the EU and the civil 
society organizations to create coalitions aimed at 
demanding compliance with reforms, to which the 
governments have themselves committed, yet this 
potential still needs to be realised. 
How can the EU improve its civil society-
related policy?
The EU can contribute in several significant ways to 
making civil society stronger in terms of influencing 
public policy and public opinion, as well as introducing 
an EU-related dimension into their domestic reform 
agenda. Above all, however, there is a conceptual 
problem, which the EU needs to tackle. The problem 
is that political elites in most EaP countries, including 
Ukraine, are not as much the EU’s partners, since 
they are also veto players, who favour the status quo 
of no reforms. This is what makes the EaP countries 
different from the CEECs. Under the current 
incentive structure, reforms appear too costly for 
these elites, while the lack of reforms does not in any 
way endanger their relationship with the EU. The EU 
can make political elites more cooperative, as was 
proposed in the first chapter of this paper. Yet, the 
EU has to realize that reform-minded constituencies 
in these countries, mostly found within civil society, 
are the EU’s true partners, into which the EU needs 
to invest. How can the EU support civil society in 
Ukraine?
Firstly, the EU has to push the Ukrainian 
authorities to involve civil society into the policy 
process in a transparent and inclusive way. It also 
has to demand that public authorities create a more 
favorable regulatory environment for civil society, 
enabling easier registration procedures and the 
reception of funds from domestic sources, including 
the state budget.45 Secondly, the EU has to increase 
the number of opportunities for the direct funding of 
civil society organizations in Ukraine. Thirdly, the EU 
has to develop capacity-building programmes for 
civil society actors. Fourthly, the EU should increase 
the amount of socialisation channels. Overall, the 
EU can build on the experience it has developed with 
the accession countries. For instance, an instrument 
similar to the Civil Society Facility (the Instrument 
within the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance 
45  Currently, Ukrainian civil society is almost 
exclusively dependent on international donors’ funding.
(IPA) for the Western Balkans) could be offered to 
Ukraine along with other EaP countries as well. More 
importantly, the EU needs to create new reference 
points and tools for the civil society to be able to 
exercise pressure on the authorities. The EU could 
well build coalitions with domestic reform-minded 
actors in Ukraine around those reference points and 
issues in order to produce change. The visa free 
action plan, listing specific reform requirements, 
conditions for receiving the second tranche of the 
direct budgetary support to reform the energy sector, 
as well as the objectives of the AA were already 
mentioned in this paper. The ‘Füle matrix’ mentioned 
in the previous chapter of the paper is another 
good example: although an unofficial document, 
it leaked to the media and the Ukrainian expert 
community (many believe it was done deliberately 
by the EU’s side) and in this way became another 
reference point. The EU could think of even more 
such reference points. In short, Ukrainian pro-reform 
constituencies can turn EU requirements into tools 
to exercise pressure on the authorities. The EU, in 
turn, needs to make sure that it does formulate such 
requirements in a specific and measurable way, and 
also backs up civil society efforts via the means of 
diplomatic and political dialogue. 
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III  The role of institutional inertia: 
bureaucracy as an agent of change?
Departing from the framework for our analysis, 
bureaucracy might be another actor relevant in terms 
of tracing the EU’s impact on the reform process 
in Ukraine. Both in the case of the EU accession 
countries and in the ENP, the EU has relied heavily 
on this class in promoting its norms and preparing 
the partner countries for deeper integration with 
the EU. For the EU, as a highly institutionalised 
community, the institutions and procedures have 
naturally played a strong role in its policies towards 
third countries. Accession countries often face the 
need to adjust their institutions accordingly in order 
to deal with the EU and to create new structures for 
this purpose. For instance, the accession countries 
had to create strong coordination mechanisms in the 
government to guide the pre-accession process, to 
change administrative-territorial systems so as to be 
eligible for structural funds after the accession, and 
to create fast-tracking mechanisms of adopting the 
acquis-related legislation in the parliaments, among 
many other adjustments. New institutions were 
created and the existing institutions adjusted for 
these countries to deal with the growing EU-related 
agenda, and more and more professionals were 
involved at all levels in the European integration 
business. All these activities were aimed at making 
the countries ‘Europeanised’ and preparing them to 
become fully integrated with the EU in view of the 
forthcoming accession. Moreover, given the rather 
technical nature of the process of integration with 
the EU, with the acquis-related requirements being 
in the centre of the process, bureaucracy at all levels 
was heavily involved.
Under the ENP Ukraine has experienced a 
similar process, yet, with one substantial difference. 
In the context of countries like Ukraine, where 
political leadership and political will for reforms 
are absent, the bureaucratic nature of the process 
where civil servants are the key agents is a positive, 
rather then a negative trend. Under the Ukrainian 
circumstances, the bureaucratised nature of the 
process of dealing with the EU has provided for the 
continuity of the process and at least some sort of 
implementation of EU requirements. Indeed, under 
the conditions of political instability and crises, 
which Ukraine experienced for the most part of the 
time since the Orange Revolution, this has made 
implementation at least partially immune against 
political turbulences (Wolczuk 2009: 207). Therefore, 
the bureaucratic class in charge of the European 
integration of Ukraine might be another important 
actor, along with civil society, which accounts for the 
domestic pressure to adopt the EU requirements.
The role of institutions and bureaucracy in the EU-
Ukraine relationship
What role has the Ukrainian bureaucratic class played 
in the EU-Ukraine relationship under the ENP? Unlike 
the EU accession countries, where this process was 
oriented towards the goal of accession, in Ukraine the 
process has reflected the EU’s growing attention and 
engagement in the country. The evolution of the EU’s 
thinking in this respect is well reflected in the constant 
development of the ENP. This development can be 
traced through almost annual Communications of the 
European Commission upgrading the ENP, the most 
recent being the launch of the EaP Initiative. Thus, the 
already existing structures created under the PCA – 
the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council, the EU-Ukraine 
Cooperation Committee, the Subcommittees and the 
Parliamentary Cooperation Committee have started 
dealing with newly evolving issues. For instance, the 
EU-Ukraine Action Plan adopted in February 2005 was 
to be monitored by the joint institutions created within 
the PCA. The Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers and 
several key ministries became involved in the process 
of drafting annual roadmaps to implement the EU-
Ukraine Action Plan. As negotiations on the AA started 
in March 2007 (at that time New Enhanced Agreement) 
a special negotiation team headed by the deputy 
foreign minister and composed of representatives of 
other ministries and central authorities was created.46 
Ukraine and the EU also developed the Action Plan 
successor document, the Association Agenda, which 
was launched as of 2010 and is aimed at preparing 
both sides for the implementation of the AA once it 
enters into force. The EaP also creates new structures, 
mostly for multilateral cooperation. Thus, Ukrainian 
officials have already become involved in the work 
of the four thematic platforms47 within the EaP, while 
the first annual foreign ministers meeting took place in 
December 2009. On top of that, programmes such as 
Twinning and TAIEX offered by the EU have involved 
more and more bureaucracy, which has become more 
informed where the EU standards are concerned.48
Where the domestic side is concerned, 
Ukraine launched the new Coordination Bureau for 
European and Euro-Atlantic Integration in November 
2008 in the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers 
46  For the current composition of Ukraine’s negotiation 
team on the Association Agreement  see Decree 2010.
47  The Thematic Platforms cover the following areas of 
cooperation: democracy, good governance and stability; economic 
integration and convergence with EU policies; energy security; 
and contacts between people. 
48  Since the Twinning was launched three years ago, 27 
governmental institutions have been involved in the programme 
(Akulenko 2009:10).
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with 50 employees dealing with various aspects.49 
The Ukrainian side of the EU-Ukraine Cooperation 
Committee and the respective sub-committees 
have met regularly for the past few years due to the 
extensive agenda of the relationship with the EU. 
Several Ukrainian ministries acquired a rather strong 
European dimension due to their important role in 
coordinating the work of the subcommittees within the 
EU-Ukraine Cooperation Committee. The Ministry 
of Economy, while also responsible for foreign aid 
(including EU assistance), is a key institution with 
regards to issues of economic integration. Termed 
as the ‘centre of excellency’ on legal approximation 
issues owing to the State Department of Legal 
Approximation under its auspices, the Ministry of 
Justice is responsible for cooperation in the field 
of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), an arena where 
the EU and Ukraine cooperate within the separate 
Action Plans on Freedom, Security and Justice. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs largely coordinates the 
negotiation process on the Association Agreement 
and has been increasingly active with regards to 
issues of cooperation between the EU and Ukraine 
in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). 
Apart from these key ministries, the Ministry of Fuel 
and Energy deals with the ENPI budgetary support 
directed towards the reform of the energy sector. 
The Ministry of Interior together with other relevant 
executive authorities has become increasingly 
involved as the visa dialogue between the EU and 
Ukraine progresses. The Ministry of Education 
deals with Ukraine’s involvement in the educational 
and research-related Community Programmes 
(for instance, the 7th Framework Programme for 
Research and Development) along with issues such 
as the Bologna process and educational cooperation 
in broader terms. While these are the key Ministries, 
this account is by no means exhaustive. 
In total it makes over 650 civil servants 
with the relevant departments in different central 
authorities working on EU-related issues50, not to 
mention numerous civil servants taking part in ad 
hoc programmes, training, and other activities.
Fewer activities of the kind take place 
outside of the capital Kyiv and the central authorities, 
yet more opportunities are also emerging on the 
regional and local levels. Thus, Ukrainian western 
regions that border the EU are involved in the four 
cross-border cooperation programmes with their 
49  After the 2010 presidential elections as Ukraine 
refused from the goal of the NATO membership, the Bureau 
was renamed into the Coordination Bureau for European 
Integration, while its stuff was reduced.
50  Information obtained from the Secretariat of the 
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.
EU-based counterparts. Regional administrations all 
over Ukraine are involved in organising annual Days 
of Europe, as well as in implementing several State 
Programmes in the field of European integration. 
Over 230 civil servants working with EU-related 
issues are based in the regional administrations.51 
In short, as the EU-Ukraine relationship progresses, 
Ukraine has not only developed new institutional 
structures at home, but also participated actively in 
those offered by the EU with the increased number 
of institutions and people involved. 
The EU has also contributed with several 
rather successful technical assistance projects aimed 
at supporting the process of EU-related institution 
building. One of the very successful projects was 
the so-called European Union Co-ordination Project 
(EUCOP), funded by the Global Opportunities Fund 
of the British Government. The establishment of 
the Coordination Bureau for European and Euro-
Atlantic Integration in the Secretariat of the Cabinet 
of Ministers mentioned above was to a large extent 
the result of this project.52 One has to note, however, 
that the presence of political will represented 
by the Vice-Prime Minister for European and 
International Integration was instrumental. On the 
same token, resistance to change led to the result 
that the objective of setting up a separate executive 
authority, headed by someone with the status of 
a Minister, was not achieved. Within the project a 
comprehensive assessment of different European 
integration coordination models was carried out and, 
based on the comparative analysis, proposals for 
the Ukrainian situation were developed. A number of 
study visits, training programmes, as well as expert 
and institutional support activities were carried out. 
The results the project achieved were the best 
possible given the political climate in Ukraine at that 
time.
Another example is the Ukrainian-European 
Policy and Legal Advice Centre (UEPLAC), which 
provides support to Ukraine in its legal approximation 
activities. The project provides support in prioritising 
the fields for legal approximation, assistance in 
preparing and drafting the legislation, and advice as 
to the implementation of the adapted legislation. The 
UEPLAC experts work with various stakeholders 
in Ukraine involved in the process of legal 
approximation, organise public events and publish 
various expert materials.53 The UEPLAC in its 
different configurations has worked in Ukraine since 
51  Information obtained from the Secretariat of the 
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.
52  See http://www.britishcouncil.org/ukraine-projects-
eucop.htm and http://www.eucop.ier.com.ua/en/index.php. 
53  For more information see the Project’s web-page 
http://ueplac.kiev.ua/. 
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the mid-1990s and has provided immense support to 
the process of legal approximation.
Finally, the ‘EU Support for the PCA 
implementation project’ is worth mentioning. 
The project developed a consolidated system of 
monitoring and, through a number of trainings and 
seminars introduced Ukrainian authorities to the new 
system of strategic planning, implementation and 
monitoring whether it comes to the implementation 
of the PCA, the EU-Ukraine Action Plan, or the 
Association Agenda.54 The project has clearly 
resulted in a change of the mindset and a more 
structured planning and monitoring on the part of the 
bureaucracy involved in the process.55
 
Implications of institutionalised and 
bureaucratised policy-making
Whether the abovementioned institutional changes 
and adjustments resulted in any substantial 
alterations beyond the immediate institutional 
settings is difficult to estimate, not the least due to 
the fact that the time frame since 2005 has been 
rather short. Nevertheless, two observations can 
be made. Firstly, there has been a steady increase 
in the number of institutions, activities and human 
resources involved. As Wolczuk (2007: 15-20) puts it, 
“enclaves” of Europeanization have been emerging 
in Ukraine. Secondly, no summits, meetings, the 
negotiation process on the AA, the Association 
Agenda, the visa dialogue, or other activities have 
been cancelled or seriously postponed despite the 
constant political turmoil in Ukraine. In fact, despite 
the never-ending political crisis, the lack of political 
will for reforms, and the economic recession to 
make things worse, the EU-Ukraine cooperation 
agenda has been growing and indeed moving from 
partnership to integration. As then deputy foreign 
minister Kostiantyn Yeliseev (2009: 1) put it:
…the age of EU enlargement based 
on politically motivated ‘waves’ is over. 
Yet, the age of enlargement based on 
gradual, year by year ‘infiltration’ has 
started. This presupposes step by 
step integration in economic, cultural, 
scientific-technological, and, as the 
result, in the political spheres. 
54  For more information see the Project’s web-page 
http://www.pca.kiev.ua .    
55  The author took part in several seminars of the 
project and communicated with both the project management 
and beneficiaries in the Ukrainian government. 
As EU and Ukraine are moving towards 
new integration projects, more and more European-
minded bureaucracy and structures are likely to 
appear. For instance, the AA, which includes a deep 
and comprehensive FTA and sectoral integration, will 
require that Ukraine aligns its legislation with that of 
the EU in many sectors and modernises its regulatory 
environment accordingly. This alone will have an 
immense impact on the judiciary, which is currently 
highly politicised, but will have to adjust itself to a 
more liberal economic environment and increased 
competition. The same can be said about Ukraine’s 
membership in the European Energy Community, 
as well as Ukraine’s chances of becoming a part 
of the European Aviation Space. As bureaucracy 
negotiates these integration projects with the EU 
with very little political leadership, at some point it 
might turn out that the integration channels have 
become numerous and well-entrenched, which will 
require different domestic actors to accept the new 
rules of the game. The theory of path-dependency 
suggests that one might become locked into a path 
and that ‘locking out’ of it might be too costly (Pierson 
2004). In other words, the institutional entrapment 
or institutional inertia might become strong enough 
to put Ukraine firmly on the European track in the 
long-term. Another way of approaching the issue 
of the implications of European integration for 
Ukraine at the level of institutions and civil service is 
through the approach of network governance. Thus, 
Lavenex (2008) and Freyburg et al. (2009) argue 
that the institutional extension of the EU’s sector-
specific governance frameworks to the neighbouring 
countries results in integration at the sectoral level 
and in the adoption of democratic standards and 
procedures in sector-specific governance, although 
not necessary implementation in practice. 
 
What else can be done to strengthen and 
expand the institutional links?
For the time being the European-minded structures 
and institutions are not well enough entrenched 
in order to challenge the current system of policy-
making and to influence the key reforms Ukraine has 
to undertake. Indeed, these are still small enclaves 
of bureaucracy and civil servants who are the agents 
of the process of European integration within public 
institutions in Ukraine. They need to be expanded 
and strengthened. Thus, the EU could consider 
expanding the Twinning programme beyond the 
central government level. Since civil servants at the 
regional level, particularly in the regions not covered 
by the cross-border cooperation programmes, 
have limited exposure to EU standards and the 
EU’s way of policy-making, a Twinning programme 
covering regional and local levels would be useful. 
This is of course complicated due to the unfinished 
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decentralisation process in Ukraine, which 
means that local authorities have limited powers 
in comparison with their counterparts in the EU 
member states. Nevertheless some pilot projects 
could be considered.
Moreover, while cross-border cooperation 
programmes are offered to local authorities from 
the western regions of Ukraine that border the 
EU, similar opportunities need to be offered to the 
other regions of Ukraine. In this respect, the recent 
proposal to launch the programmes of inter-regional 
cooperation between the EU and the EaP partners is 
worth being elaborated and implemented.  
Next, apart from capacity building for civil 
servants, the EU needs to employ an approach 
where entire institutions will be targeted. The 
Twinning programme, although a good instrument 
of socialization, has had limited impact due to the 
lack of motivation for civil servants to apply the skills 
they gain. Given that institutions remain unreformed 
there is no demand for the skills and knowledge 
introduced by the Twinning programme (Akulenko 
2009:10). Thus, fostering the capacity of individual 
civil servants needs to be matched with reforming 
institutions and the entire civil service system. The 
implementation of the Comprehensive Institution 
Building Programme offered under the Eastern 
Partnership could be a solution. The idea of jointly 
(EU and Ukraine) selecting several core institutions 
in specific sectors and reforming them based on the 
detailed and comprehensive reform plans with clear 
timelines and sources of support seems to be a step 
in the right direction. It is expected that by the end 
of 2010 the EU and Ukraine will agree and sign the 
Memoranda of Understanding on the Framework 
Document, which will identify institutions and issues 
to be tackled. As a next step, the multiannual 
institutional reform plans will be developed for each 
selected institution. The EU would have to assist not 
only with funding, but deploy its experts to advice 
and provide guidelines on the ground, and to take 
stock of the progress. 
Finally, implementation is important. Legal 
and institutional changes do not automatically lead 
to new practices or the European way of policy-
making. It was observed already in the EU accession 
countries that the process of Europeanisation often 
resulted into establishment of ‘Potemkin institutions’ 
(Jacoby 2004: 17). In Ukraine, where the rule of law is 
very weak, meaning that there is lack of law-abiding 
culture, the risk of non-compliance is expected to 
be much higher. Thus, the EU needs to think of 
more scrutiny and guidance where implementation 
is concerned. In this respect, the decision to set 
up the Joint Committee at Senior Official Level 
(CSOL) to jointly define annual objectives and 
oversee implementation of the Association Agenda 
was a positive step. One of the reasons for poor 
implementation of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan during 
2005-2008 was the lack of the joint decision-making 
on implementation of the Action Plan; in other words 
the Ukrainian government decided unilaterally on the 
annual objectives and measures to be implemented 
within the Action Plan (Duleba et al. 2008: 24). In 
contrast, under the Association Agenda, the joint 
CSOL allows for joint decision on the objectives 
and regular taking stock of the progress of their 
implementation (Joint Committee at Senior Official 
Level 2010). As a next step the EU might think of 
more guidance on implementation at the level 
of different institutions where implementation is 
actually taking place backed up by more staff at the 
EU Delegation in Ukraine.
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IV Is incremental European integration 
under risk? Russia as an intervening variable  
Ukraine seems to create a bigger challenge for 
the EU (as compared to the CEECs and even the 
Western Balkans) not only from the perspective 
of its domestic developments, but also from the 
perspective of being the country where the EU’s 
influence is counterbalanced by another external 
power, namely Russia. Unlike the EU’s policy, which 
aims at promoting democracy, rule of law, good 
governance and at liberalising Ukraine’s market, 
Russia’s policy seems to pursue the objective of 
maintaining or even increasing its influence in 
the post-Soviet space and therefore its weight on 
the global scale.56 Weakening and destabilising 
the neighbours may well be a part of the strategy, 
especially when it comes to the need to legitimise 
its own regime at home. While the rationale behind 
Russia’s approach and policy towards Ukraine is 
a topic, which deserves a separate study (Duleba 
2009), for the objectives of this paper it is important 
to understand what kind of influence Russia has or 
may have on Ukraine in terms of counterbalancing 
the EU’s Europeanising impact.  
Clearly, the roots of the problem are in 
Ukraine itself. It is a young country that lacks a 
coherent political nation and a clear sense of direction 
in terms of the model of transformation (European 
versus post-Soviet). Finding itself between the two 
conflicting normative powers with conflicting value 
systems makes it difficult for Ukraine to make a 
clear-cut choice in favour of the European model 
of transformation. While everything European is 
attractive, Russia still appears as a strong state 
with higher social and economic standards than 
Ukraine. The problem is also increased by the strong 
Soviet legacy and the lack of reforms in Ukraine 
despite pro-European rhetoric since late 1990s. 
As a result, for many people, who still remember 
Soviet social standards and relative security and 
stability, independent Ukraine has failed to present 
a more attractive alternative system with its policy of 
European integration. 
Besides the fact that Ukraine lacks a clear 
sense of direction, its political elites stand ready to 
exploit the international environment and popular 
moods for earning domestic political dividends. 
Thus, no political force or political leader advocates 
European integration in terms of explaining to 
the voters the specific benefits of integration with 
the EU. At the same time many political forces (in 
56  See Leonard et al. (2009) for a good account of 
perspectives and approaches towards this topic in Russia.
fact the majority of the presidential candidates in 
the 2010 campaign) promoted the concept of a 
neutral status/’third way’ for Ukraine, given that 
popular support for European integration was low. 
Although the newly elected president of Ukraine 
Viktor Yanukovych made his first international visit 
to Brussels57, he relied heavily on pro-Russian 
rhetoric before and after the election clearly in 
the attempt to gain political scores against the 
background of deteriorated relationship with Russia 
under Yushchenko’s presidency. The attempts to 
‘improve’ relationship with Russia apparently went 
too far, as a number of policy moves in relation to 
Russia alienated the electorate in the Western 
Ukraine. Those steps include a large number of 
meetings with either President Medvedev or Prime-
minister Putin, and often without transparent and 
open agenda. These have also included two visits 
by the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church 
to Ukraine whereby he was welcomed by President 
Yanukovych and other Ukrainian politicians, the 
removal of the objective of the NATO membership 
from Ukraine’s agenda followed by the adoption 
of the law prohibiting Ukraine to join military and 
security blocks (read NATO), and the decision to 
prolong the lease on the port of Sevastopol for the 
Russian Black Sea fleet.
Moreover, many business interests in 
Ukraine, which are affiliated with political elites, 
find it more attractive to derive short-term economic 
benefits from cooperation with both the EU and 
Russia without incurring the potential political and 
economic costs integration with either of the sides 
might bring (Puglisi 2007: 90). While moving towards 
a free trade area with the EU will require substantial 
short-term costs, as a result of the increased 
competition and transparency, the political costs 
of economic and political integration with Russia 
might vary between losing control over strategic 
assets such as the pipeline network system to losing 
sovereignty in foreign and domestic politics. Under 
these terms the status quo of balancing between 
Russia and the EU, without going too far in either 
direction may look like the best option from the 
perspective of the political elites. While before 2004 
it was fashionable to frame such a policy as a ‘multi-
vector’ policy, the new concept offered by Ukraine’s 
current foreign minister Kostiantyn Gryschenko is 
that of ‘strategic balancing’ (Hryshchenko 2010: 
1). Gnedina conceptualizes this policy through the 
prisms of Putnam’s two-level game theory, whereby 
Ukrainian elites sustain ‘a complex bargaining 
game with Russia and the EU, trying to extract as 
many concessions as possible from both partners’ 
(Gnedina 2009: 9). 
57  The inauguration took place on 25 February 2010.
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One example, which well illustrates this way 
of thinking, is the decision to prolong the lease on 
the military port of Sevastopol where Russia keeps 
its Black Sea fleet for another 20 years in exchange 
for cheaper Russian gas. While the stationing of the 
Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol creates a 
number of problems to Ukraine (Solonenko 2009: 
204-208), not to mention the fact that turning it into 
a commercial harbor would better serve Ukrainian 
interests, the cheaper gas from Russia in no way 
contributes to the reform of the gas market in 
Ukraine or stimulates energy efficient production. 
Simultaneously, Ukraine adopted the law on the 
gas market, which is one of the conditions for 
Ukraine to receive international financial support for 
modernization of its gas transportation networks.58 
The law relies on the relevant EU legislation and was 
developed in consultation with the EU Delegation 
to Ukraine, yet it in no way guarantees that it will 
be implemented to reform Ukraine’s energy market 
in practice (Institute for Economic Research and 
Political Consulting 2010). 
The above indicates that, as much as 
Ukraine’s location between the two different value 
systems complicates the development of a coherent 
political nation, it also serves as an opportunity 
for shortsighted and rent-seeking political elites to 
receive political dividends and economic gains. In 
this situation, where the Ukrainian public at large is 
not aware of the benefits of integration with the EU 
might bring, Russia appears to be better positioned to 
maintain its influence in Ukraine. Russia has always 
been a close neighbour of Ukraine and, moreover, 
it shares the same Soviet past with Ukraine. The 
EU has become Ukraine’s direct neighbour only 
recently. Moreover, in many ways Russia appears 
closer and easier to understand for Ukraine than 
the EU. This has to do with the common language 
(although Russian has no official status in Ukraine, 
it is widely spoken), the common informational 
space (given that Ukrainian television, cinema and 
entertainment industry are in a bad shape, while 
Russia could build on the Soviet infrastructure that 
remained in Moscow, Ukrainian informational space 
is overwhelmed with Russian products59), and a 
58  On 23 March 2009 the EU hosted an investment 
conference in Brussels at which it was agreed to grant Ukraine 
a € 2.5 billion loan for the rehabilitation of Ukraine’s gas 
transit system; and the Joint EU-Ukraine Declaration was 
signed, which committed Ukraine to undertake reforms in the 
energy sector. This provoked a negative and sharp reaction 
by Russia, which has been trying to control the Ukrainian gas 
transit system for a long time.
59  Russian media only covers 7% of the Ukrainian 
audience (Pelnēns 2009: 293). Nevertheless, the editorial 
policy of many Ukrainian TV channels and of the printed 
media is far from objective, which means that coverage is 
often presented from a Russian perspective.
similar mentality. Finally, Russia appears to be 
easier to access and more open. Ukrainians enjoy 
visa free and even passport free (Ukrainians can 
travel to Russia with a domestic identification card) 
travel to Russia, while those Ukrainians who have 
any experience of obtaining a Schengen visa know 
the difficulties associated with it. 
Apart from this ‘soft’ leverage60 Russia 
demonstrates a good potential to use more active 
and aggressive tools to influence decision-making 
in Ukraine. Firstly, Russian leverage stems from 
Ukraine’s energy dependency. Since 200361 
Ukraine is 100 per cent dependant on Russian 
gas (Ukrainian gas production satisfies roughly 
only 1/3 of its domestic consumption, households, 
public institutions and industry taken together), 
while energy efficiency is very low in Ukraine. The 
2006 and 2009 gas wars, when Russia cut off its 
gas supplies to Ukraine and, as a result, to other 
European countries serve as a good example. 
The border between Ukraine and Russia, which 
is not demarcated (exists on the map agreed by 
both sides, but is physically absent outside of 
the crossing points), is another problem.62 The 
transparency of the border makes Ukraine exposed 
to illegal migrants from third countries who head to 
the EU63, while protected external borders is one of 
the conditions for the visa free travel with the EU. 
Russia shows interest in maintaining the status quo 
and in this way preserving its leverage over Ukraine. 
On one occasion it even made clear that a unilateral 
demarcation of the border by Ukraine might lead to 
the introduction of visa requirements for Ukrainian 
citizens. Given that such a move would be highly 
unpopular among the electorate-rich East-Ukrainian 
regions, Ukrainian political elites would not dare 
pushing too harshly. Finally, the stationing of the 
Russian Black Sea fleet in the Ukrainian harbour of 
Sevastopol is another leverage Russia is interested 
in maintaining. 
The Russian factor is probably not the 
biggest one that hinders the reform process in 
Ukraine. Apparently the causes of the lack of 
reforms are domestic. Yet, Russia complicates 
60  For a comprehensive overview and comparison 
of the Russian and the EU’s leverage vis-à-vis the Eastern 
neighbours see Popescu/Wilson 2009. 
61  Before 2003 Ukraine was also purchasing gas from 
Turkmenistan. Since 2003 Russia is purchasing the Turkmen 
gas for export; the contract was signed for 20 years.
62  This refers to the land border. For more information 
on this aspect see Solonenko 2009: 198-203.
63  According to some estimates, up to 80 per cent 
of illegal migrants who head for the EU through Ukrainian 
territory come from Russia (in fact, from third countries 
through Russia). See Kravchenko 2006.
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Ukraine’s Europeanisation looking against the 
background of our analytical framework for EU’s 
transformative power towards Ukraine. This paper 
has shown that the EU has limited impact on the 
political elites and the reform process mainly due to 
the fact that under the current EU’s policy towards 
Ukraine (based on long-term and vague incentives 
with lack of conditionality) and the current political 
regime in Ukraine (rent-seeking political elites with 
short-term thinking), the costs of compliance with 
EU requirements are too high, while non-compliance 
costs next to nothing. At the same time, the domestic 
pressure for adaptation in Ukraine has been low. 
Where the EU has succeeded it has been by helping 
to create the enclaves of Europeanisation and 
reference points for those reform-minded actors. 
These actors have so far had limited impact. Yet, 
assuming that the EU-Ukraine relationship are 
progressing with more bilateral commitments, more 
pressure and involvement on the part of the EU, 
and more institutional and people-to-people links 
emerging, this ‘incremental integration’ might lead 
towards greater compliance with EU norms and 
practices in the long term. This model might work 
given there is no additional external intervention, 
which can upset the EU’s impact. Russia seems 
to be exactly the actor possessing the leverage to 
upset the EU’s whatever limited impact.
More specifically, Russia helps to encourage 
non-compliance with EU demands, since it offers 
short-term benefits for shortsighted political elites 
for policies, which go contrary to Europeanisation 
objectives. In other words, the incentive to 
implement reforms becomes even lower on top of 
the already low costs of non-compliance with EU 
demands (no possible sanctions on the part of the 
EU). Additionally, Russia might apply threats to 
withhold political or economic support to incumbent 
or oppositional political elites, thus encouraging 
certain policies leading Ukraine away from the 
reform process. Russia’s potential to influence public 
opinion in Ukraine, more so than the EU, increases 
vulnerability of Ukraine’s political elites vis-à-vis 
Russia. In short, Russia’s influence mainly supports 
the status-quo (Racz 2010) under which the EU-
related reforms are not implemented or delayed. 
In this situation, the EU needs to employ 
a more strategic thinking to counterbalance the 
Russian influence if it is serious about Europeanising 
Ukraine. This could be done by focusing on positive 
agenda and introducing more socialisation and 
institutional channels, while at the same time making 
the EU more visible in Ukraine not only via the visits 
of the EU officials, but also via tangible regional 
development and infrastructure projects. The EU 
needs to comprehend that, unlike the CEECs and 
the Western Balkans, Ukraine and other eastern 
neighbours are not ‘empty vessels’ (Popescu/
Wilson 2009: 51) due to the Russian interest in 
these countries. Thus, the EU needs to complement 
its policy focused on institutional inertia with tools, 
which would make the EU more politically visible and 
significant in Ukraine. In this respect the presence 
of both the High Representative Catherine Ashton 
and the President of the European Parliament Jerzy 
Buzek at the inauguration of President Yanukovych, 
as well as visits by several European Commissioners 
and the President of the European Council Hermann 
Van Rompuy in the following months were positive 
moves. The EU could also make Ukraine-related 
issues part of its political dialogue agenda with 
Russia, making clear that it also has an interest in 
the region and that stable Ukraine would benefit all 
parties. 
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Conclusions
Several months before the presidential election 
in Ukraine, the former Ukrainian Ambassador to 
the EU Andrii Veselovsky and his deputy Vasyl’ 
Filipchuk both stated that Ukraine should submit 
its formal application for EU membership in spring 
2010, following the presidential elections (Rettman 
2009: 1). This move reflected the mood of the pro-
European and reform-minded part of the Ukrainian 
society which understands that mobilization around 
the idea of Europeanization and a shift of the balance 
of power in favour of the supporters of this idea is 
only possible after the country acquires a sense of 
direction. On the day of the Ukrainian Presidential 
inauguration in February 2010, the European 
Parliament supported this intention by adopting a 
resolution, which made reference to Ukraine’s right 
to submit an application for membership based 
on Article 49 of the Treaty on the European Union 
(European Parliament 2010). Given the ambivalence 
of Ukraine based on its historical legacies and strong 
veto-players among the political elites, the country 
indeed needs a strong external reference point, 
which could have a mobilizing impact on the reform-
minded forces. 
 Yet, given that the membership perspective 
might be wishful thinking, one has to look at the 
leverage the EU could potentially have irrespective of 
this strategic and symbolic commitment. To this end, 
the paper has attempted to challenge the opinion 
that the ENP has failed to make a difference in 
Ukraine. Indeed, a closer look suggests that multiple 
actors and processes in Ukraine have reacted 
differently to the EU’s policy, and the interplay of 
various domestic trends with EU influence has 
resulted in a rather patchy picture. Firstly, the paper 
has shown that the EU has had almost no impact on 
the political elites in Ukraine. This segment of the 
Ukrainian society largely represents the interests 
of the business administrative groups who possess 
the majority of the country’s economic wealth and 
are well positioned to use state institutions in their 
interest, rather than pursue what can be understood 
as national interest. This group is in principle in 
favour of European integration and is definitely 
interested in preserving its sovereignty vis-à-vis 
Russia, which means that there is a ‘red line’ in 
terms of how far certain representatives of the elites 
are prepared to compromise. In other words, the 
policy of balancing between the EU and Russia that 
Ukrainian elites have pursued, without going too far 
in any direction, is highly beneficial for satisfying 
their short-term individual interests. Under the EU’s 
current incentive structure, the Ukrainian political 
elites can continue their policy of balancing, which 
means that they make commitments to the EU, but 
only implement those commitments very selectively 
and on an ad hoc basis. As long as they keep to 
the minimal standards of free and fair elections 
(one of the achievements of the Orange Revolution) 
and certain elements of procedural democracy (the 
EU’s unspoken ‘red line’), the current pace of the 
relationship with the EU will be preserved. In short, 
the mode of conditionality the EU has offered to 
Ukraine so far allows the political elites to avoid the 
costs of reforms, while still enjoying the benefits that 
integration with the EU offers to them. The EU can 
improve its policy by limiting the scope of action of 
the Ukrainian political elites and by matching their 
short-term thinking. This means introducing short-
term incentives and developing very specific and 
clear-cut objectives and requirements.
 Given the nature of the Ukrainian political 
elites and their limited reform potential, it is important 
to know whether the Ukrainian society can play a 
role here and whether the EU has enhanced its 
role. The paper has shown that the potential of the 
Ukrainian civil society to influence the reform has 
by and large remained rather weak. Civil society 
has not managed to hold the elites accountable or 
to influence reforms. At the same time, civil society 
has had limited impact on public opinion and the 
mobilisation of the society at large – another factor 
that allows the political elites to ignore civil society. 
The paper has shown that the EU has offered some 
tools for the limited circles of civil society to put certain 
EU-related issues on the agenda and, thus, influence 
public discourse, as well as decision-making at the 
bureaucratic level. The EU, its member states, and 
its civil society have also increased the socialisation 
channels for Ukraine’s civil society. Yet, the EU has 
failed to grasp that in countries like Ukraine, where 
the political elites are predominantly veto-players, 
reforms cannot be pushed for without civil society 
and the EU acting in coalition. This means the EU 
would need to invest more into civil society in order 
to turn it into a strong domestic partner who could 
push for the EU agenda from within. To this end, 
the EU would need to widen its outreach among the 
Ukrainian civil society; it would also need to assist 
in solving some structural problems, such as the 
unfavourable regulatory environment and the lack of 
funding from the state budget. These issues should 
become part of the political dialogue with Ukrainian 
public authorities, which need to take responsibility 
for civil society development in the country. Last, but 
not the least, the EU needs to engage in capacity-
building activities for civil society, borrowing some 
instruments from the accession policy toolbox.  
Finally, the paper has shown that the EU, 
due to its institutionalised way of policy-making, 
has managed to create a certain amount of path-
dependency and institutional inertia (mostly at 
the bureaucratic level). It has encouraged the 
development of new EU-related institutions in 
Ukraine and has also assisted this process via 
technical assistance projects. Moreover, the EU 
has developed a number of bilateral and multilateral 
institutional links with Ukraine, and a number of 
these institutions are growing. Interestingly, the EU-
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Ukraine negotiations and the pace of cooperation 
have proved to be immune to the overall political 
climate: none of these processes has been halted 
by the political instability in Ukraine. The paper has 
argued that it might even be possible to talk about 
the potential for institutional ‘entrapment’ of Ukraine 
(which means the EU would create a critical mass of 
institutional links with Ukraine, as well as institutions 
and procedures within Ukraine, which would make 
opting-out too difficult). For the time being, however, 
the relevant processes are not yet well entrenched. 
Evidence suggests that Ukraine has embarked on a 
process of incremental integration with the EU and 
‘bifurcated’64 Europeanization. The EU has become a 
reference point for many domestic actors in Ukraine, 
but it has not yet produced a critical amount of 
resources (actors and institutions) in Ukraine, which 
would put the country firmly on the European track.
 Due to the EU’s weak incentive structure 
and weak conditionality, which is matched by weak 
pressure for reforms from inside the country, the 
potential of these processes for inciting fully-fledged 
Europeanization remains questionable. The EU 
needs to strengthen its conditionality – thus reducing 
the costs of reforms vis-à-vis the potential benefits – 
and introduce short-term incentives compatible with 
the short-term thinking among the political class of 
the country. The EU also needs to be clear that its 
policy will not succeed unless it is matched by strong 
domestic pressure for reforms, which at the moment 
can only come from civil society. Turning civil society 
in Ukraine into a true reformist partner requires 
more investment on the part of the EU. Finally, the 
EU needs to deal with Russia’s conflicting policy, 
by effectively counterbalancing its influence. These 
three elements – high adoption costs resulting 
from the nature of the incumbent regime and weak 
conditionality on the part of the EU, little domestic 
pressure for reforms from within, and the intervening 
Russian factor – create a very specific situation for 
the EU’s transformative power, not only in Ukraine, 
but in all the other Eastern neighbourhood countries. 
These elements limit the EU’s transformative power, 
as compared to the CEECs and even the Western 
Balkans. If the EU is serious about reforming and 
Europeanizing its Eastern neighbours – which is in 
fact a commitment made by the EU in the ENP and 
the EaP – it needs to deal with these three elements 
in the future.
64  Hughes, Sasse and Gordon (2004) use this term 
when conceptualizing the Europeanization of the CEEC .
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